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during this past year should also be conligated. The United States must be in a position to employ these programs with the utmost speed and precision to accomplish our goals under the wriftly shifting streamstances of the world.

Our country's participation in technical-cooperation programs with he vigatorized to desire the vigatorized to fall due to lack of necessary technical and demonstration equipment to the need of the host countries. Third, they should be tightly adjusted to the need of the host countries. Third, they should be so administered as to reach as many people as possible, helping them take their own standards of living and ables their own problems. Technical-cooperation programs now before the Congress are based on these fundamentals. These programs are our most effective countermeasure to Soviet propaganda and the best method by which to create the political and social stability essential to lasting peace.

Three months ago I advised the Congress that economic assistance on a grant basis should be terminated as swiftly as our national interest would allow. This concept underlies the new programs. In Europe economic assistance is recommended only for a few local programs of especial importance. As rapidly as feasible in our relationships with other countries, these programs are being supplanted by more durable undertakings in the field of mutually profitable private investment and trade. As such trade and investment expands, the need for grant assistance will further diminish. But this expansion takes time and effort. This requires that in strategically located, underdeveloped areas of the world. some grant assistance must be continued for an additional period of time. Such assistance is also needed for certains countries which lack the economicapacity to establish and equip forces needed for the common mise.

Notwithstanding the controlling need

for such grants, we must strive constantly toward relationships with our friends which are more satisfactory, both to them and to us, than grant assistance. This legislation should, therefore, reserve for loans not less than \$100 million of the fiscal year 1955 funds. Such loans would be made where there is reasonable change of repayment in dollars or in local currencies, and should be extended in a manner that would not substantially impair a country's capacity to borrow from private banking sources, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the Export-Import Bank. This is a vital step toward the general replacement of grant economic assistance. We shall achieve this goal as quickly as world conditions and our national welfare permit.

In the administration of the mutual security program, agricultural surpluses will be used to strengthen the economies of friendly countries and to contribute in other ways to the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives. We shall also attempt to use other products of our

A Control

farms and the output of our industries whenever their use is consistent with the constituted objectives of the program, after taking into account such factors as availability, price, and quality. In the conduct of these and other mutual security programs a Foreign Operations Administration performs a necessary function and should be continued.

The United States has chosen carefully from among many alternatives in order to chart a sound course in the

We have chosen to build defenses with our allies rather than go it alone, because we are convinced that this course is more effective and less costly.

We have chosen to help develop and expand world markets, because we believe that this course will strengthen the economies of all free nations, including our own.

We have chosen to exchange technical knowledge and ideas with our friends, because we believe that course will go far toward countering the effects of Communist propaganda, while at the tame time promoting peace through improved political and economic stability.

Having embarked upon these courses of action, we shall follow them through. We did not choose the gigantic struggle now endangering the world, but surely this is clear: During periods when the contest is bardest, we must not father, we must not abandon programs of positive action. Instead, at such a time we must intensify sensible and positive action.

This program of multiple security is such action; it is one of our most effective, most practical, least costly inclineds of achieving our international objectives in this age of peril.

I therefore strongly urgo enactment of mutual security legislation along the lines I we herein according cuttined.

Dwight D. Free showers.

HE WHITE HOUSE, June 27, 1954.

NEED FOR PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNITED STATES FOR-EIGN INTELLIGENCE ACCURREN

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSET which and was given permission to be consolate House for 1 minute and a levise and extend his remarks

Mr. FRELINGHULLERN. Mr Speaker, I have introduced a day a bill. H R 9660, to create a Council on on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. This will be a 9-man Presidential commission, 5 members of which shall be appointed by the President, who shall also designate the cir man. Four members are to be appointed from the Congress, 2 from the Security and 2 from the House.

This commission will have two major responsibilities: First, to make a full and complete investigation of this country's foreign intelligence activities; and, scond, to examine the security of these intelligence agencies from penetration by subversive elements. The findings and recommendations of the commission are to be submitted both to the Congress and the President on or before March 1, 1955.

I should like to make a few brief comments to explain why I am proposing this Commission on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. In the first place, I think all of us here in Congress place, I think all of us here in Congress and overall effectiveness of our national intelligence effort is of vital importance to our remaindous military expenditures could be greatly lessened, or even nulliculated if our intelligence system is ineffective or faulty. The very safety of our Nation would be jeopardized if we were not forewarned of a sneak attack. It is essential for us to have sound estimates on the intentions and capabilities of our potential enemies. We cannot afford another Pearl Harbor.

A commission such as I am proposing would make a thorough, intensive, and impartial survey of our foreign intelligence activities. No such inquiry has been made since shortly after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. For that reason it is timely and appropriate to take this step now.

As we all thow, the Congress has voted considerable sums for these intelligence agencies, and yet we know virtually nothing as to the scope and success of their operations. Members of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, it is true, have some knowledge of their expenditures and the types of activities involved but no comprehensive study has been made. For that reason also it seems the part of wisdom for the Congress to authorize this investigation.

I realize that President Eisenhower, if he sees fit, could establish such a Commission without any legislative assistance. On the other hand this is a field where the Congress might logically take the initiative. By expressing contributional interest, we can authorize a directed but thorough investigation, sugar-vised by a responsible and supartial Commission.

Others have suggested that a joint committee on the Central Int hardward Agency be established to provide a rational and presumably discrete back on that agency. I do not below such an over-the-shoulder, which is not mittee is necessary, that chart I think that it is preferred for a condensal Commission to be conducted with a majority of its members appointed by the President. These intelligence agencies are responsible to the executive branch, and they should be made primarily accountable to the President.

If we agree that a study of some and is advisable, some of us may feel that an investigation by a congressional conmittee would be sufficient and appropriate. I definitely do not agree with such a view. The confidential and infinitely varied nature of our intelligence effort, it seems to me, precludes a public airing such as a congressional investigation would entail. It was realized in 1947 that publicity would perhaps defeat the purposes for which the Centrel Intelligence Agency was formed. For thai reason the Congress exempted the CIA from the usual surveillance required of other

Control of the Control of the vital movernhope that the Con-All stiples before that the Con-

COMMENTE ON INTERNAL

AVITS asked and was given to address the House for 1 to address the House for 1 to the and to revise and extend his

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, the hearmiss in the other body respecting the Department of the Army have now closed but the problem of adopting rules of fair procedure and proper organization for congressional investigations of commucongressional investigations of communism and subversion urgently demands solution at this session of the Congress. What we have seen in the other body makes this an indispensable element of the majority's program and as both Houses are so closely divided equally makes the dispersions showed the dispers of

The hearings showed the dangers of the deep national division, distraction of the Congress from urgent business at a crucial moment in world history and damage to our country's prestige in the free world, and the whole country was shaken by the bid to Government employees to break security and their oaths of office. In the life and death struggle between the free world and the Communist imperialist and totalitarian world in this quotation marks "war," whether hot or cold, there can be only one Commander in Chief leading us and that under the Constitution is the President. What we have seen of an instanton to break down the President's authority in the Government must convince us that the interest; of the country and the prestice of the Congress as the legislative arm of Gov. ernment demand measures to end the dangers of excesses in these congressional investigations.

The powers of the Conserve with respect to be madive oversult cable the most complete inquire to be made into the offere of Cover front apparentials. There is no remone why this control cannot be utilized by communities a such without incurring damars as rent in individual Atembers anting of their own with respect to the authors, visited to the committee

The rules of propeding proposed in House Comprised Resolution 202 bave been drawn by our tending legal mathorities and represent elementary rule. of faitness. Excesses in congressional

practical way to act on this tent national issue. The text of the is is appended hereto:

Andrew Allender JUNE 23, 1954. Drai Cottagns: The Senate hearings in the controversy between Senator McCarrir ometaively how excesses in congressional investigations of communism and aubrersion can (a) divide the country on fundamentals in which division is neither trallitional nor good for the national interest, (b) discract the Congress, (c) seriously damage our downtry's prestige in the free world, and (d) seppardize the essential division of powers in our Government between the President and the Congress. Under these circumstances the Congress. Under these circumstances remedial missures become an indispensible element of the majority's program and as both figures are so closely divided equally a reponsibility of the minority.

The charge petition No. 8 which I have placed on the Speaker's desk seeks to bring the misse Concurrent Resolution 202, 10 establish a Joint Committee on Literature.

tablish a Joint Committee on Internal Scurity; and to provide for statutory rules of Sair procedure. It offers members the opportunity to take remedial action on this vital national issue before the Congress adjourns. If the subject is successfully brought up on the discharge petition the House can work its will as to the remedy it desired to mitter

Under House Concurrent was the joint committee would take in place the joint committee and the resulting and the particle and subcommittees dealing with never without of communism and subversion a a could be organized and operate in a way a magous to the Joint Committee on Atomic Diergy, The joint committee could refer specific investigations to standing legislation committees or call for the appointment of fact committees or statutory o coming a die particular investigational, h 100 11 11:4 procedure provided in her Respitation 202 with the her individuals of these in investigations and more than the pressure of the pressure of the power to investigate the same of the power to investigate the same of the pressure of the pre there are aspected by ... but of the city of News ing bar i ssociato no I hope very much in an fat makes the prompt of potation in the

REGRESS CONTRACT GREEL Company Comment TIOR

(Mr. 1908, WAN of and was in the monitoria House for the sum and the tend his remarks.

Mr. HOFFMAN of M. Speaker, view do grad-

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There shows fruit they are less for the variety of the showing fruit they are less for the variety of the showing fruit they are less for the variety of 20 to the showing fruit the public in the showing fruit the public in the showing fruit they sign that they sign the showing fruit the measure to establish a procedure. It offers every them or a pracedure. It offers every them or a pracedure. It offers every them or a pracedure in the showing fruits as to whether and the showing fruits and the provide for statutory to procedure. It offers every them or a pracedure in the showing fruits as to whether the showing fruits and the provide for statutory to procedure. It offers every them or a pracedure in the showing fruits and the showing fruits a West Poil (Mr. Jayres) just said may be Il very well, but where does it get us? of tresions investigations and was chairman of a one-man comin 1936—is that whether rished at the property of the characteristics of the members of the committee which conducts the invest

On the issue as to whether employees should give inforr 31. inefficiency or violations of "dera! statutes to Members of the Senate or the House, we have in the past had some top officials who did not pay any attention when they were told about Communists. It may be just possible—not probable that you might have someone at the head of an executive department who was in

sympathy with an unlawful activity.

Of course, t is the business of the executive departments to enforce the law, and information of violations of law should first be given to them, but when the law is not enforced, when an official or an agency will not act, when they cover up for a crook, is every Federal employee to keep secret all the information he may have after he has given it to the executive department? After the Federal employee has given information showing violations of the law or treason itself to the proper executive officers and no action has been taken, has he not a right to go to his Senator or to his Member of Congress and tell him of the improper procedure of the commission of ${f a}$ crime?

Now, think it over a little. Are we all to cover up for every crook in every exerutive agency or department? Think about it before you form an opinion

SPECIAL ORDERS

Mr. SHEEHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for the minutes on tomorrow, Thun day, for the mer any special orders hereloft of our con-

Mr. JAVITS asked and which the missim to vacate the cospecified to him for todev

RULES OF PROCEDURE TO LONG. GRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SE

(Mr. CLARDY asked at the conpermission to address the r property and to revise some 1-10-1753

HE CLARDY, Me 4, the difference anythere of from New York constrainments of miled rules of contract 111 a carry of ford family son Line tich we near all - Well we need to have a moute f ...ute j the the sen of high, then I and the thoughty polition.

ory morement that is 40ne for to be ner with the trainers in our sales that we have leaned over back-